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1. FAMILY INVOLVEMENT IN BUSINESS AND PERFORMANCE
Does family involvement in business (FIB) help or hinder a firm’s 
financial performance (FP)? Significant scholarly time and efforts 
have been devoted to understanding the nature of this relationship. 
But, findings are mixed ranging from positive, neutral, to negative, 
regardless of whether market- or accounting-based measures of firm 
performance (FP) are used (e.g., Miller, Miller, Lester & Cannella, 
2007; Rutherford, Kuratko & Holt, 2008).
Positive findings that reveal family firms outperform non-family firms 
are explained in two ways. First, concentrated ownership alleviates 
the conflict of interest between owners and managers reducing agen-
cy costs (e.g., Berle & Means, 1932; McConaughy, Matthews & Fia-
lko, 2001). Second, competitive advantages are gained through the 
long-term perspective that family involvement in management encou-
rages (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chami & Fullenkamp, 1997).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prior empirical research has found positive, negative and neutral relationships between family 
involvement in business and firm performance. These inconsistent findings may be partly ex-
plained by the different levels of family involvement. Family firms are not homogeneous entities; 
there are family-owned, family-governed and family-managed firms. These variations lead to 
different configurations based on the components of family involvement which can be captured 
by using set-theoretic methods. Applying this method to an international sample of 6,611 firms, 
we identify seven configurations in firms that lead to superior financial performance. 
RESUMEN DEL ARTÍCULO 
Diversos estudios empíricos han encontrado una relación positiva, negativa y neutra entre la 
implicación familiar en la empresa y la rentabilidad de la compañía. La inconsistencia de los 
resultados obtenidos puede estar motivada por los diferentes niveles de implicación familiar. 
Las empresas familiares no son entidades homogéneas sino que, en realidad, hay empresas 
propiedad de la familia, gobernadas por la familia o gestionadas por ella. Todas estas varia-
ciones dan lugar a diferentes configuraciones basadas en los componentes de implicación 
familiar y que pueden ser estudiadas empíricamente empleando métodos basados en la teoría 
de conjuntos (fs/QCA). Utilizando esta metodología con una muestra internacional de 6.611 
empresas identificamos siete configuraciones que conducen a una rentabilidad superior. FAmILy INVOLVEmENT - FIRm PERFORmANCE LINk: 
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When family firms underperform in comparison to their non-family 
counterparts, entrenchment, nepotism and lack of professional ma-
nagement are stated to be culprits (Lansberg, Perrow & Rogolsky, 
1988). A second type of agency conflict appears in family-owned 
firms when large family shareholders use their controlling position in 
the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of small sharehol-
ders (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Neutral findings are said to be contingent upon a number of firm-
specific features. And, this evidence is mounting. For example, while 
performance was found inversely related to family ownership level in 
non-dual firms where CEO and Board chairman roles are separated, 
no such relationship was found in dual firms (Braun & Shar-
ma, 2007). In privately held firms, while family involvement 
in ownership (FIO) had no effects on performance, a nega-
tive effect of family involvement in management (FIM) with 
firm performance was revealed (Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008).  
How might one reconcile these conflicting empirical results 
between FIB and FP? While different perspectives might be 
used to address this question, in this article we focus on the 
ill-defined concept of FIB and related methodological cha-
llenges for researchers. Family business scholars tend to 
use different approaches to define and measure FIB. While 
some studies use dichotomous categorizations of FIB (e.g., whether 
family ownership in a firm exceeds the 5% threshold), others adopt 
continuum measures such as the F-PEC scale developed by Klein, 
Astrachan and Smyrnios (2005) that aims to capture the outcome 
variables of power, experience and culture in the family enterprise 
due to the FIB. Thus, at this stage of the literature, different empirical 
definitions of FIB based on ownership, governance, management or 
succession criteria are in use leading to contradictory results. This is 
further complicated by differences in first and later generation firms, 
and in firms operating under different legal structures and institu-
tions.
In this paper, we seek to investigate the FIB-FP in a novel manner. 
First, we do not measure FIB as a dichotomous or continuum va-
riable but as a typology. That is, we argue that there are several ty-
pes of family firm with varied components of family involvement and 
each of them may have different impact on FP. Second, we examine 
whether there exists a positive, negative or neutral relationship bet-
ween each type or ‘set’ of family firms and FP, taking into account 
We argue that there 
are several types of 
family firm with varied 
components of family 
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the complementarities and interactions existing between the diffe-
rent components of family involvement. We use a novel method not 
yet adopted in family business studies - fuzzy sets/qualitative com-
parative analysis (fs/QCA). This method enables us to investigate 
the effect of simultaneous occurrence of multiple variables in family 
firms (referred to as configurations) on FP, rather than measuring the 
affect of individual components such as family ownership or mana-
gement on FP. 
2. COMPONENTS OF FAMILY INVOLVEMENT IN BUSINESS
Since the inception of scientific research on family enterprises, 
scholars have used Venn diagrams and other pictorial depictions to 
describe and understand the nature of family and business overlaps 
in these hybrid identity firms (see Sharma & Nordqvist, 2008 for a 
review of these models). For example, Davis (1982) developed a 
model of three overlapping circles each depicting family member-
ship, ownership and managerial roles. This simple yet elegant mo-
del laid the foundation for future extensions such as the addition of 
changes in each circle over time (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997). Shar-
ma & Nordqvist (2008) presented a typology of 72 different cate-
gories of family firms based on the extent of family involvement in 
ownership and management of the firm. In addition to ownership 
and management, family involvement in governance and its plans 
for trans-generational continuity or succession are often added as 
two other integral components likely to influence FP (e.g., Handler, 
1989).
Table 1.  Possible family firm configurations
faMiLy invOLvEMEnt in iS thiS a 
faMiLy fiRM? OwnERShiP GOvERnanCE ManaGEMEnt
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Yes Yes No ?
3 Yes No Yes ?
4 Yes No No ?
5 No Yes Yes ?
6 No Yes No ?
7 No No Yes ?
8 No No No NoFAmILy INVOLVEmENT - FIRm PERFORmANCE LINk: 
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However, although theoretical developments elaborate rich catego-
ries of family firms, in practice, researchers tend to use dichotomous 
or continuous measures of FIB. Lack of a robust method for dealing 
with complex configurations has been a stumbling block. To illustra-
te the complexity of possible categories of family firms, if we simply 
consider the role of family involvement in firm’s ownership, manage-
ment, and governance, there are eight (23) possible configurations 
as depicted in Table 1.
Which of the eight combinations qualify as a family firm? Are each 
of these similarly related to FP? Although it is easy to agree that the 
1st category is a family firm and the 8th is not, the other six combina-
tions are less obvious. The number of configurations and complexity 
further increases when additional integral variables such as succes-
sion are included. In short, it is obvious that the specific operational 
definition of family firm used in an empirical study is likely to influen-
ce the findings. For the same set of firms, different definitions used 
may even reverse the results of the relationship between FIB – FP. 
We suggest that if we can use all possible categories of firms ba-
sed on all factors related to family involvement in business that have 
been considered as integral in previous research, the margin of error 
can be significantly reduced and confidence in obtained results can 
be improved. Given the lack of consensus in the field about which 
factors account for firm performance, in this exploratory study, we 
consider four factors – ownership, management, governance, and 
succession – to empirically determine the possible combinations 
between these factors that lead to superior FP. This approach should 
lead to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
FIB and FP that is likely to benefit both the scholarly and managerial 
communities.
3. SET-THEORETIC METHODS APPLIED TO FAMILY FIRMS
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a methodology for asses-
sing combinations of causal conditions that lead to an outcome (Ra-
gin, 2008). Developed in late 80s by Charles Ragin, this method is 
gaining momentum in social science research. The underlying logic 
used in this method is that if a large majority of members with a given 
combination of conditions satisfy an outcome, then it is considered 
sufficient for the outcome to be present in that set of members. For 
example, in this study, if a large majority of family firms with a parti-
cular mix of family’s involvement in ownership, management, gover-ROBERTO gARCíA-CASTRO & PRAmOdITA ShARmA
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nance, and succession, are found to have superior firm performance, 
then that configuration is considered to be a winning configuration. 
There can be several winning configurations however, as we will later 
find. 
To apply this method, the researcher starts with a phenomenon to 
be explained, called the outcome – FP in our case. Then, the possi-
ble conditions that may have an influence on that phenomenon are 
listed – ownership, management, governance, and succession in 
this study. Next, each item (family firm) is assessed on the extent 
to which it satisfies the outcome and each of the causal conditions. 
A combination of qualitative reasoning and quantitative techniques 
is used to assess whether a family firm belongs to a specific set or 
not. 
If the number of possible established causal conditions is k, then 
there are 2k possible combinations of causal conditions, also called 
configurations. In this study, we use five causal conditions – owner-
ship, management, succession, and two dimensions of governan-
ce. Thus, there are 32 (25) possible configurations. Each family firm 
in the sample can belong to only one of these 32 configurations. In 
other words, each configuration is associated with a subset of family 
firms. If the majority of firms with a particular configuration of family’s 
involvement in ownership, management, governance, and succes-
sion, lead to high firm performance, then that is a winning configu-
ration. 
Because this method works with proportions in any set, it allows for 
the individuals’ conditions of membership to be relaxed both regar-
ding causal factors and the outcome. This enables the usage of de-
grees of membership. For example, a family firm with 100% owner-
ship is considered to be a full member of the set, another firm with 
zero family ownership is considered fully outside the set. Firms with 
50-100% ownership are considered more in than out, while the rever-
se is true for firms with less than 50% ownership. Maximum ambiguity 
lies with 50% ownership – a case that requires qualitative judgment. 
This generalization is known as fuzzy set analysis (fs/QCA2). Given 
the peculiarities of this method, the winning configurations identified 
in this study indicate likely combinations of FIB that lead to high FB   
rather than a guarantee that if a firm adopts those combinations it will 
surely achieve high performance. However, this method helps bring 
more clarity to the likely winning configurations than we have had 
thus far.FAmILy INVOLVEmENT - FIRm PERFORmANCE LINk: 
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3.1. Sample
We use a dataset of 6,611 publicly listed and major unlisted com-
panies from 46 countries using the OSIRIS database (Bureau Van 
Dijk)3. The full OSIRIS database for the year 2005 has about 19,000 
publicly listed and major unlisted/delisted companies from around the 
world. In this study, we include non-financial firms with complete data 
on the variables of interest. Excluded were financial and insurance 
firms that lacked ownership data and other firms with inconsisten-
cies in balance sheets such as negative values in positive-defined 
accounts. 
3.2. Measures of the components of family involvement
The set-theoretic analysis with fs/QCA requires transformation of va-
riables into sets that are calibrated regarding full membership, the 
cross-over point of maximum ambiguity and full non-membership for 
every variable of interest. These values are qualitative anchors to 
determine which cases belong to each of the sets analyzed. Below, 
we briefly share how the calibration was carried out for each variable 
(also see Table 2). 
Five basic components of family involvement were used in this study: 
family ownership, family management (CEO), succession, and two 
components of governance – family board and chairman. Family ow-
nership is computed by adding all shares owned by family members 
with same surnames. Firms with 1% or lower family ownership are 
considered a non-members or non-family firms, 5% is the crossover 
point, and 25% or higher ownership is considered high family involve-
ment in ownership4.
Family board captures the family presence on the board of directors. 
It is computed as the ratio of family directors to total board directors. 
In its definition of family firms, the European Group of Owner-Mana-
ged and Family Enterprises (GEEF) requires that there be at least 
one family member on the board. Hence, we use the lowest percenta-
ge (1% threshold for full non-membership) in order to leave out of the 
set those firms with no presence of family members on the board. For 
the crossover point, we take the same 5% used for our first variable 
and a threshold of 10% is used for full-membership or family domina-
ted board.
Chairman carries the value of 1 when a family member is the chair-
man of the board of directors. Otherwise, it is set to 0. Similarly, CEO 
takes the value of 1 when a family member is the CEO of the company ROBERTO gARCíA-CASTRO & PRAmOdITA ShARmA
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and 0 otherwise. For Succession, a threshold of 30 years is used to 
create a proxy measure. If a company is less than 30 years of age it 
is considered to be in first generation taking a value of 0. Firms more 
than 30 years in age take the value of 1 that assumes a succession 
has been completed. 
3.3. Performance and control variables
Industry adjusted Return on equity (ROE) is used to measure FP. In 
addition to controlling for industry effects, this allows for comparisons 
with previous research as ROE is one of the most frequently used 
performance measures in the literature (Rutherford et al., 2008). Fo-
llowing Fiss (2010), 20, 50, 80 percentiles are used to transform the 
original ROEs into a fuzzy set. For example, firms in the top 20% of 
the distribution have full membership in the set, thereby considered 
as superior performers. Those in the bottom 20% are considered low 
performers and 50% is the crossover point used. 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics and set calibration (fuzzy and crisp sets)
DESCRiPtivE StatiStiCS MEMBERShiP CRitERia
n. OBS. MEan St. DEv. fULL MEMBERShiP
CROSSOvER 
POint
fULL 
nOn-MEMBERShiP
OwnERShiP
Family 
Ownership 6,611 8.86% 17.4 25% 5% 1%
GOvERnanCE
Family Board 6,611 6.30% 13.17 10% 5% 1%
Family 
Chairman1 6,611 16.02% - Crisp set (1,0)
ManaGEMEnt
Family CEO1 6,611 16.44% - Crisp set (1,0)
SUCCESSiOn
Succession1 6,611 11.25% - Crisp set (1,0)
Anglo-Saxon1 6,611 42.23% - Crisp set (1,0)
Size
(Log assets) 6,611 12.94 2.03 14.71 12.76 11.17
ROE adjusted 6,611 0.02 0.21 0.09 0.01 -0.07
1 Dummy variables – Family member Chairman, Family member CEO, Succession (firm over 30 years of age) or Anglo-Saxon firms 
take the value of 1, others are valued as 0 FAmILy INVOLVEmENT - FIRm PERFORmANCE LINk: 
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Two additional control variables used in this study are firm size and 
legal system. Small family firms are distinguished from large by taking 
the log of a firm’s assets and using 20, 50, 80 percentiles of distribu-
tion to create fuzzy sets using similar logic as done for ROE. For le-
gal systems in which the firms operate, we distinguish between firms 
operating in Anglo-Saxon (value of 1) and non-Anglo-Saxon (value of 
0) systems. 
4. RESULTS AND FINDINGS
Table 3 depicts all the possible combinations using the five compo-
nents of family involvement in business. It is interesting to note that 
although theoretically there are 32 (25) possible configurations, empi-
rically in this sample, only 24 are found with at least one observation. 
Furthermore, this number drops down to 11 when we consider com-
binations with at least 1% of cases in the sample (66 firms). While 
null sets reduce complexity of the typology, they also reveal the more 
popular or perhaps pragmatic categories. For example, almost all of 
the non-family owned firms have little family involvement in board or 
management. On the other hand, family owned firms both young and 
old seem to follow several different pathways in terms of the mode 
of family involvement in management and governance. Almost 35% 
of family owned firms (691) retain both governance and managerial 
control of the enterprise, regardless of whether they are in first or later 
generation of leadership.
Table 4 shows the fuzzy set analysis results. In addition to the five 
components of family involvement in business, this analysis includes 
two additional variables - company size and legal tradition that are 
likely to influence FP. Thus, the number of theoretical configurations 
increases to 128 (27). Table 4 shows the seven winning configura-
tions that lead to superior industry adjusted ROE. Full circles in this 
Table indicate the presence of a condition, crossed-out circles su-
ggest its absence, and a blank space means that this condition is not 
binding in that particular configuration. This is the case, for example, 
of family ownership in configuration 1A.
The high overall solution consistency5 of .84 indicates that the set-
subset connections found are strong and well-supported by the data. 
However, the overall solution coverage of .039 is low, indicating that 
although the relationships found are consistent, they apply only to a 
reduced number of firms in the sample. This suggests the possibility 
of other causal factors of FP beyond the FIB considered in this study. ROBERTO gARCíA-CASTRO & PRAmOdITA ShARmA
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Table 3.  typology of family firms found in the sample1
COMPOnEntS Of faMiLy invOLvEMEnt in BUSinESS2
in thE SaMPLE
OwnERShiP GOvERnanCE ManaGEMEnt SUCCESSiOn
faMiLy 
OwnERShiP
faMiLy 
BOaRD
faMiLy 
ChaiRMan
faMiLy CEO SUCCESSiOn fiRMS # %
N
4,616 
(69.82%)
N
4,596 
(69.52%)
N
4,596 
(69.52%)
N
4,596 (69.52%)
N 4,570 69.13%
Y 26 0.39%
Y
-
N - -
Y - -
Y
-
N
-
N - -
Y - -
Y
-
N - -
Y - -
Y
20 
(0.30%)
N
9 (0.14%)
N
6 (0.09%)
N 5 0.08%
Y 1 0.02%
Y
3 (0.05%)
N 1 0.02%
Y 2 0.03%
Y
11 (0.16%)
N
2 (0.03%)
N 2 0.03%
Y - -
Y
9 (0.13%)
N 7 0.11%
Y 2 0.03%
Y
1,995 
(30.18%)
N
197
(2.97%)
N
168
(2.51%)
N
167 (2.50%)
N 97 1.47%
Y 70 1.06%
Y
1 (0.01%)
N - -
Y 1 0.02%
Y
29
(0.46%)
N
23 (0.37%)
N 14 0.21%
Y 9 0.14%
Y
6 (0.09%)
N 4 0.06%
Y 2 0.03%
Y
1,798 
(27.21%)
N
780 (11.80%)
N
405 (6.13%)
N 258 3.90%
Y 147 2.22%
Y
375 (5.67%)
N 259 3.92%
Y 116 1.75%
Y
1,018 
(15.41%)
N
327 (4.95%)
N 214 3.24%
Y 113 1.71%
Y
691 (10.46%)
N 440 6.66%
Y 251 3.80%
1 For the sake of simplicity, all the sets are represented in this table as “crisp sets” (Y/N). However, it is important to note that only 
chairman, CEO and succession are truly crisp sets while Family Ownership and Family Board are fuzzy sets where each firm has a 
different degree of membership to that set from 0 (fully out) to 1 (fully in). 
2 Y =”Yes” when the component is above the cross-over point.  / N = “No” when the component is below the cross-over point .
Shades areas indicate categories with over 1% (66) firms in the sample.FAmILy INVOLVEmENT - FIRm PERFORmANCE LINk: 
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Seven configurations indicate superior industry-adjusted ROE confir-
ming that different pathways can lead to the same desired outcome. 
Four of these are in the Anglo-Saxon category (1A-4A), two in the 
non-Anglo-Saxon category (5N and 6N) and one compatible with any 
legal tradition (7AN). 
Our first superior performing firms are large young Anglo-Saxon 
firms (1A). Family involvement in these firms is limited to the CEO 
position. However, this family leadership position is balanced by mi-
nimal family involvement in governance as the board chairman is a 
non-family member and the family holds less than 5% of board posi-
tions. Such firms may or may not be family owned. 
With some exceptions, high performing large older Anglo-Saxon 
firms (3A and 4A) tend to have family more involved in governance 
roles while leaving the management of the firm to non-family profes-
Table 4.   Seven winning configurations with high industry-adjusted ROE1
anGLO-SaXOn fiRMS nOn-anGLO SaXOn fiRMS
anGLO & nOn-
anGLO fiRMS
1a 2a 3a 4a 5n 6n 7an
1St GEn. 
LaRGE fiRMS 
with faMiLy 
CEO
 2nD OR LatER 
GEn fiRMS 
with faMiLy 
ChaiRMan
2nD OR LatER 
GEn LaRGE 
fiRMS with 
faMiLy 
ChaiRMan
2nD OR LatER 
GEn LaRGE 
fiRMS with 
faMiLy 
BOaRD
1St GEn faMiLy 
OwnED anD 
ManaGED fiRMS  
1St GEn LaRGE 
faMiLy OwnED 
anD ManaGED 
fiRMS 
1St GEn faMiLy 
OwnED fiRMS
Family 
ownership
X X X
Family 
Board
X X X X X X
Family 
Chairman
X X X
Family CEO X X
Succession X X X X
Large Size
Consistency .920 .948 .930 .898 .926 .894 .838
Raw 
Coverage .001 .001 .001 .003 .001 .001 .035
Overall Solution Consistency .844
Overall Solution Coverage .039
1       Presence of conditions
    x  Absence of conditions
   A: Anglo-Saxon
   N: Non Anglo-Saxon 
   AN: Either A or NROBERTO gARCíA-CASTRO & PRAmOdITA ShARmA
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sionals. Smaller older Anglo-Saxon non-family owned firms (2A) 
also do well under non-family management though family is often in-
volved in governance of the firm. Non Anglo-Saxon family owned 
and managed first generation firms perform well with independen-
ce of governance from family (5N, 6N). Family owned large first ge-
neration firms outperform when governance is in non-family hands 
(6N, 7AN). 
Going beyond the specific configurations, Table 4 reveals some in-
teresting regularities. First, in general, larger firms tend to out-per-
form smaller firms in terms of industry-adjusted ROE. Nevertheless, 
the smaller firms can be highly profitable as well, when management 
is separated from governance (2A, 5N). Second, in terms of legal 
tradition, our analysis suggests different configurations can lead to 
high performance in both Anglo-Saxon (1A-4A) and non-Anglo-Sa-
xon countries (5N-6N). Indeed, the hybrid configuration (7AN) has 
the highest coverage (.35) providing larger confidence in these fin-
dings. 
Third, family CEO and succession seem to work as substitutes for 
each other; firms with family CEO and no succession (1A, 5N, 6N) 
seem to perform above the median; but so do firms with no family 
CEO that are in the second generation (2A, 4A). This pattern of 
substitution between family CEO and generation has been observed 
previously by other researchers. For example, Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) and Pérez-González (2006) found that, first generation family 
CEOs create value but when descendants serve as CEOs, firm value 
is destroyed. However, 3A suggests these findings are not universally 
applicable as large second generation firms can do well under duality 
of a family CEO and a family Chairman, as long as family does not 
dominate the Board.  
Finally, our results provide some evidence that firms with family CEO 
and non-family chairman (1A, 5N), and vice-versa (2A), tend to per-
form better than firms where family members occupy both roles (CEO 
duality). However, configurations 3A and 6N evidence that this result 
does not hold in all configurations.  
Overall, these results confirm that there are several equally effective 
pathways that family firms can choose to achieve high performan-
ce. However, these pathways can only be revealed and explained in 
terms of configurations. The analysis demonstrates that the impact 
of each individual component on FP is contingent on all the other 
components and, hence, this finding should be taken into account in FAmILy INVOLVEmENT - FIRm PERFORmANCE LINk: 
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future research. In addition, it makes clear that it is the combination 
of factors rather than individual components that explain firm perfor-
mance. 
5. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Does family involvement in business (FIB) foster, hinder, or have no 
effect at all on firm performance (FP)? In this article, we address the 
FIB-FP relationship by empirical testing the configurational approach 
that has long been theoretically suggested in the literature (e.g., 
Sharma & Nordqvist, 2008). Thus, the primary contribution of this stu-
dy is to introduce a new technique – fuzzy set analysis (fs/QCA) into 
family business studies and for the first time reveal the empirically 
supported configurations of family involvement in business that lead 
to superior performance. 
This study confirms that the components of FIB do not exert an im-
pact on industry-adjusted ROE in isolation. Instead, these compo-
nents are related each other and to FP in a complex way. Therefore, 
it is the configurations as a whole, and not the individual components, 
that lead to high industry-adjusted ROE. Although some of these win-
ning configurations are revealed in this study, others might be disco-
vered in subsequent research as additional relevant variables such 
as business life-cycle, firm strategy, financial structure and other firm-
specific features that may affect FP are considered.
Results of this study suggests that in general, a mix of family and 
non-family involvement in ownership, management, and governan-
ce works better across size, generation and legal traditions. When 
family ownership and management are high, governance must be in-
dependent. Otherwise, family must stay involved in governance. But, 
generalities veil a number of intricate and powerful specificities as 
indicated by the winning combinations presented in Table 4. 
While it won’t come as a surprise to managers that each firm – family 
or non-family – is unique in its own peculiar way. Thus, caution must 
be exerted when blindly transplanting the ‘best practices’ that worked 
for one firm to another. However, this study reveals that some com-
binations of family involvement in business seem to work better than 
others as shown in Table 4. For instance, a question that frequently 
challenges family firm owners - what is the bottom line impact of na-
ming a family CEO? The answer, as often found in management, is 
it all depends. Family CEOs lead to high performance in large An-
glo-Saxon firms when there are no family members on the board of ROBERTO gARCíA-CASTRO & PRAmOdITA ShARmA
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directors (1A) or in non Anglo-Saxon family owned firms when the 
governance is in non-family hands (5N and 6N). By contrast, a family 
CEO has, potentially, a negative performance effect in Anglo-Saxon 
non-family owned firms (2A and 4A). Although there are no straight 
forward answers, the set-theoretic methods used in this study, bring 
managers and researchers closer to understanding what combina-
tions work better than others.
This study also joins the growing consensus on the diversity and he-
terogeneity of family enterprises by differentiating between family-
controlled, family-governed and family-managed firms. Keeping this 
distinction in mind is important both for managers as they think of 
adopting the ‘best practices’ from one firm to the another, and for 
scholars to systematically select their research samples and elucida-
te the scope of their research findings. It is our hope our introduction 
of the set-theoretic methods in family firm studies will be the ‘first sto-
ne’ in a long and well used pathway of research. 
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1. Contact author: IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra. Camino del Cerro del 
Águila, 3. 28023 Madrid, España. 
2. For more technical discussion of this method, please refer to Ragin (2008). And, for an 
application of this method in family firm study, please see García-Castro & Casasola (2011).
3. http://www.bvdep.com/en/osiris.html 
4. While we describe the threshold point, full and no-membership for family involvement in 
ownership and board (Table 2), in this exploratory study for the sake of simplicity, we use 
crisp sets with 0 and 1 values in Table 3. All firms with values lower than the threshold point 
are converted to 0 and others to 1.
5. The consistency assesses the degree to which cases sharing a given condition or a 
combination of conditions display the outcome in question. That is, consistency indicates 
how closely a perfect subset relation is approximated. Consistency values ranges from 0 to 
1, where 1 indicates a perfect subset relation. 
The coverage assesses the degree to which a cause or a causal combination “accounts for” 
instances of an outcome. The coverage can be thought of as a measure similar to R-square 
in regression models, allowing the researcher to evaluate the empirical relevance of the 
solutions found. 
The calculation of fuzzy set-theoretic consistency and coverage is done as follows:
Consistency (Xi ≤ Yi) = ∑ [min (Xi ,Yi)] / ∑(Xi)
Coverage (Xi ≤ Yi) = ∑ [min (Xi ,Yi)] / ∑(Yi)
where Xi is the degree of membership of individual i in configuration X and Yi is its degree of 
membership in outcome Y.
In this study, both consistency and coverage are set to 0.75. The solutions are depicted at 
the bottom of Table 4.